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I. Introduction
The United States International Trade Commission ("ITC") is a unique venue
for patent enforcement. After a finding of patent infringement, the ITC, an
administrative agency, has the power to enlist United States Customs and Boarder
Protection ("Customs") to bar entry of the infringing products into the United
States. ITC actions also must, pursuant to statute, end within a defined time period,
causing such cases to move swiftly.' Finally, because of their exclusive jurisdiction
over such actions, ITC administrative judges are seen by many as patent law savvy
and, in turn, patentholder friendly. As a result, the ITC has become a favored
jurisdiction for patent infringement disputes, being used more and more by
patentees.
While the ITC has been available to patentees for quite some time,2 only
recently has the venue become a significant player. Patent actions before the ITC
have nearly doubled in recent years.4 Scholars have begun to examine in depth the
ITC's place in patent law,s looking, for example, to see if the venue is patent
friendly6 or at least really comprised of patent experts.7
Given the ITC's recent rise in patent law, the next logical focus of scholarly
inquiry is on its strength as a patent venue and whether it has staying power. Will
patentee use of the ITC continue to increase or is this just a fad? There are also
questions as to whether the advantages of the ITC to patentees are really that
strong.
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Kyocera Wireless Corp. v.
International Trade Commission presents the first real test to the favorability of
the ITC. Prior to Kyocera, the ITC was willing to grant remedies to exclude
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (2006).
2 Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis ofPatent Cases at the International
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 63, 67 (2008) (noting that the 1930 Trade Act estab-
lished the "Section 337" action before the ITC for patent infringement).
Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV.
529, 529 (2009) (stating that the ITC "has recently experienced a dramatic increase in patent in-
fringement investigations").
See Chien, supra note 2, at 69.
6 David Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing
Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1699, 1709-11 (2009).
7 Robert Hahn & Hal Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of Interna-
tional Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARv. J. L & TECH. 457, 460 (2008).
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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imports by individuals not explicitly named as a respondent in a given ITC action.
Essentially, the ITC would grant relief in the form of a limited exclusion order
("LEO") to exclude third party products that infringe by using a respondent's
technology. The ITC employed what became known as the EPROM factors to
determine when a remedy can cover non-respondents. 9
The Federal Circuit reversed this practice in Kyocera, finding that the ITC's
statutory authority limited LEOs to the named respondents.'o Such a broad remedy
is now reserved for only general exclusion orders ("GEO's"), where a patentee
must satisfy a much higher burden then under the ITC's EPROM factors."
After the decision in Kyocera was issued, many wondered how it would
impact ITC practice. There are law review collections on the case,1 and many law
firms issued "legal alerts" informing patentees of the decision.' 3 Most of these
commentaries include three postulates: the Kyocera decision will force patentees to
name more respondents in ITC cases in order to get a remedy similar to that
enjoyed before under the EPROM factors; the rate of requests and grants of GEOs,
which can exclude non-respondents, will increase to compensate for Kyocera; and
that Kyocera makes the ITC so unfavorable as a patent enforcement venue because
of the restriction on remedies that the number of ITC filings will go down.
While these articles evidence the high interest amongst industry, practitioners,
and academics in both Kyocera and the ITC, the articles contain only speculation as
to Kyocera's impact. No one has systematically examined what has really
happened to ITC practice post-Kyocera, even though more than two years have
passed since the decision's issuance. Nor has anyone used Kyocera as a litmus test
on the viability and strength of the ITC as a patent enforcement venue.
This Article fills these voids; it tests the various postulates and describes the
real impact of the Kyocera decision. While doing this, the Article also provides
real insight into how strong the ITC is in patent law.
The Article does this by looking at all ITC utility patent investigations filed
after the date of the Kyocera decision until the end of 2010 (eighty-seven
investigations) and comparing them to a similar number filed prior to the decision.
9 The EPROM factors are set forth in Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories,
Components Thereof Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such
Memories, USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, at 125 (May 1989).
10 Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1355-56 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)).
" Id. at 1356 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A) and (B)).
12 See Symposium, Where is the ITC going after Kyocera?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 701 (2009).
1 See, e.g., Sidley Austin LLP, General Exclusion Orders in the Wake of Kyocera, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ITC SECTION 337 UPDATE, (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.sidley.com/SidleyUpdates/Detail.aspx?news=4152.
3
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
For both periods before and after Kyocera, the number of named respondents per
investigation as well as the raw number of investigations is observed. The subset of
investigations that were filed prior to Kyocera, but still pending when Kyocera was
issued, were also examined to determine whether respondents were added after
Kyocera. Additional information on the grant of GEOs both before and after
Kyocera is also collected. This data can test whether Kyocera has changed the
number of respondents, the grant of GEOS, or the number of investigations. Data
from district court patent infringement actions filed in parallel to the observed ITC
cases is collected as a control in an attempt to isolate the impact of Kyocera.
The results of the study run counter to the conventional wisdom on Kyocera.
Patentees have not reacted in any of the ways projected after Kyocera. There is no
statistical difference between the average number of respondents per ITC case
before Kyocera and those observed after. This lack of statistical difference is even
observed in the industries most likely to be affected-electronics and computer-
related technologies. Furthermore, no respondents were added in those ITC
investigations pending when Kyocera was issued.
Nor has the grant of GEOs increased. The number of ITC investigations
continues to rise at a rapid pace. While all of this is going on, the number of
defendants in the parallel district court cases has stayed constant; this discounts
other legal or economic influences that may have counteracted Kyocera's effect at
the ITC and thus explains the lack of change. To date, Kyocera, appears to have
not caused the dramatic changes predicted.
These results speak volumes for the attractiveness of the ITC as a patent
venue. Even with the effectiveness of the venue significantly diminished by
Kyocera, the ITC's use continues to rise. The data suggests that the ITC is here to
stay and almost all patent enforcement actions will take place, at least in part, in the
ITC. The landscape of patent enforcement has permanently changed, and the ITC
is a solid part of it.
This Article reaches these conclusions by first, in Part I, describing the unique
features of the ITC that make it a favored venue of patentees. Part II describes the
Federal Circuit's decision in Kyocera and the various postulates as to its impact.
Part III describes the study, the specific data obtained, and the results. Part IV
analyzes the results, looking at whether the predictions of Kyocera were true and
what the data says about the ITC place in patent enforcement.
II. ITC's Unique Position in Patent Enforcement
The ITC provides a special forum for hearing patent infringement disputes.' 4
"Section 337" (19 U.S.C. § 1337) gives the ITC power to both exclude products
14 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); Kumar, supra note 3, at 534 ("Patent litigation in the ITC differs
significantly from litigation in federal court."); Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 460-61.
4 [ VOL. 20: 1
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that are found to infringe a U.S. patent and issue cease and desist orders to the
same.15 A patentholder files a complaint with the ITC, requesting that the ITC
investigate the alleged infringement of a U.S. Patent, which harms a domestic
industry.16 A Section 337 action then proceeds before an administrative law judge
("AL"), who determines questions of infringement and validity, amongst others. 7
These determinations are ultimately reviewed by the ITC commissioners, the
President, and then appealable to the Federal Circuit.'8 A parallel action for patent
infringement can be pursued in United States district court.
The number of Section 337 actions has grown tremendously over the past
twenty years. 20 The average number of section 337 actions was ten per year in the
1990s; this doubled from 2000-2007, when the average jumped to twenty-three a
year.2 ' The increase in use is particularly prevalent in the electronics industries
given that most products containing these technologies are manufactured abroad
and imported into the United States.22 This puts the ITC in a unique position to
provide effective remedies in this area of technology. 23
Several perceived advantages contribute to the increased use of the ITC as a
patent enforcement forum. The first is jurisdiction. The ITC gains jurisdiction over
importers via the "mere act of importation." 24 This makes jurisdiction over foreign
companies much easier, and less complex, than in United States district court where
venue and personal jurisdiction rules can deny jurisdictional coverage over such
defendants.25
The second perceived advantage is the speed of ITC proceedings.26 Fast track
27
adjudication venues have historically attracted patentees. The ITC is required, by
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (setting forth exclusion standards); Kumar, supra note 3, at 537-38.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1); Kumar, supra note 3, at 536.
17 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1); Kumar, supra note 3, at 536.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b), (c); Kumar, supra note 3, at 536-37 (setting forth ITC procedures for patent
actions).
19 Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 851 F.2d 342, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Chien,
supra note 2, at 74-75.
20 Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 460 (Figure 1).
21 Id.
22 See id. ("A review of the ITC Database of section 337 investigations ... suggests that other
important industries are affected by the ITC's role in patent law, including computers,
semiconductors, and communications systems.").
23 Id. at 461.
24 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1); Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 461; Kumar, supra note 3, at 535.
25 Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 461; see also Kumar, supra note 3, at 535 ("The ITC also has
nationwide jurisdiction to conduct investigations, including nationwide service of process for
subpoena enforcement actions.").
26 Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 461.
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statute, to complete an investigation "at the earliest practicable time after the date
of publication of the notice of such investigation." 2 8 Statistics show that "on
average a district court case took about twice as long as an ITC case to fully
litigate." 29
Third, there is a perception, that the ITC is patent friendly. 30 This perception
is based on results, with patentees wining in 65% of cases between 1975 and 1988,
compared to 40-45% in district courts. 3 1 Given the exclusive jurisdiction over
Section 337 cases, the ALJ's are also very experienced with patent cases, which
may also lead to patent friendliness.3 2
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ITC has extremely favorable
remedies for patentees: exclusion orders barring the importation of infringing
products and cease and desist orders barring the sale of imported articles.33 The
ITC can issue two types of exclusion orders: the limited exclusion order ("LEO")
and the general exclusion order ("GEO"). The LEO is limited to excluding those
infringing products imported by respondents and is very similar to an injunction in
district court.34 The GEO, on the other hand, prohibits all importation of infringing
products regardless of source." A GEO therefore applies to all importers of the
36infringing product, regardless of whether they were a party to the litigation.
Given these injunctive remedies are essentially the only remedies the ITC can
issue,37 "the ITC is extremely likely to issue injunctive relief following a finding of
infringement." This is even true after the Supreme Court's decision in eBay v.
27 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 401, 403 (2010)
("Patent plaintiffs generally want speed.").
28 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1); Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 704.
29 Chien, supra note 2, at 101-102.
30 Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 490 (finding a bias at the ITC in favor of patent holders). But cf
Chien, supra note 2, at 98 (finding that data does not support the hypothesis that the ITC is biased
against defendants).
3' Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 461-62 ("The perception that patent holders enjoy an advantage
at the ITC is reinforced statistically.").
32 Id. at 462-64; David Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1709 (2009).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (f); Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 462.
34 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1); Kumar, supra note 3, at 537-538.
3s 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); Kumar, supra note 3, at 538.
36 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); Kumar, supra note 3, at 538.
37 Civil penalties are also available to remedy violations of exclusion and cease and desist orders.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f.
38 Hahn & Singer, supra note 7, at 462; see also Chien, supra note 2, at 99 ("[Prevailing patentees
are] essentially guaranteed to get [an injunction] in the ITC (79 percent injunction rate vs. 100
percent injunction rate).").
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MercExchange, which has limited the availability of injunctions in district court
patent infringement cases.39 In contrast, as the Federal Circuit recently held, the
four-factor equity test for injunctions set forth in eBay does not apply in Section
337 actions. 40 The close linkage between the ITC and Customs increases the
efficacy of the exclusion orders, making the remedies available even more
attractive. All of these factors are magnified by the extreme value such injunctive
relief, or at least the threat of it, has for the patentee in litigation, settlement
discussions, and competition.41
III. Kyocera Decision and the Predictions
Prior to the Kyocera decision, the ITC would issue LEOs that excluded all
infringing articles made by the respondents, regardless of who the importer was.42
Those products that include the infringing product are considered "downstream"
products in that they incorporate the infringing product into a more complex
product that is then imported into the United States.43 To obtain an LEO that
excluded all downstream products, regardless of importer, a patentee had to meet
the EPROM test, established in the ITC's decision in Certain Erasable
Programmable Read-Only Memories." The EPROM test sets forth nine factors
that, if met, allow an LEO to apply to third parties to the ITC investigation.4 5
The Federal Circuit examined both the ability of the ITC to issue LEOs that
applied to non-respondents and the EPROM test in Kyocera. The decision and the
postulated impacts of the decision are set forth below.
A. Federal Circuit's Decision in Kyocera
In Kyocera, Broadcom Corporation filed a complaint with the ITC alleging a
violation of Section 337 naming Qualcomm Incorporated as the only respondent.46
Broadcom alleged that thirteen of Qualcomm's wireless telecommunication chips
and chipsets infringed several of Broadcom's patents.47
3 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding four-factor test for permanent injunc-
tion relief applies to disputes under the Patent Act).
40 Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
41 See generally Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv.
1991 (2007).
42 Where is the ITC Going after Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 709.
43 id.
44 Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof Products
Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. 2196, Inv.
No. 337-TA-276, at 125 (May 1989).
45 id.
46 Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1345-46.
47 Id. at 1346.
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The ITC determined that Qualcomm's chips infringed one of Broadcom's
patents.48 The ITC also concluded that Qualcomm induced wireless handset
manufacturers to include the infringing chips in their mobile devices. 4 9 The ITC
granted an LEO excluding "[h]andheld wireless communications devices, including
cellular telephone handsets and PDAs, containing Qualcomm baseband processor
chips or chipsets that" infringed Broadcom's patent.50 Thus, the LEO included all
downstream products that included the infringing chips, regardless of whether the
downstream products were actually imported by Qualcomm.
Six companies who manufactured, sold, or both manufactured and sold
downstream products including Qualcomm chips intervened at the remedies stage
of the ITC action.5' These interveners, with Qualcomm's support, argued that since
they were not named respondents in the ITC action, their actions could not be
subject to the ITC's LEO.52
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) limits LEOs to
excluding only named respondents. 3 The Court noted that the ITC is a creature of
statute, and thus the scope of any remedy it issues is limited by its statutory
authority. 54 Section 1337(d)(1) limits LEO exclusions to articles "imported by any
person violating the provision of [Section 337]" 55 and § 1337(d)(2) indicates that
LEOs "shall be limited to persons determined by the Commission to be violating
[Section 337]."
Section 337's plain language describes the two forms of exclusion orders:
[T]wo distinct forms of exclusion orders: one limited and one general. The
default exclusion remedy 'shall be limited to persons determined by the
Commission to be violating this section.' By contrast, a 'general exclusion'
order ('GEO') is only appropriate if two exceptional circumstances apply.
Specifically, under subsection d(2)(A), the Commission may issue a GEO if it is
'necessary to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of
named persons' or, under subsection d(2)(B), if 'there is a pattern of violation of
this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.'5 7
48 id.
49 id.
50 Id. (quoting the ITC's LEO).
s' Id. at 1354.
52 Id. at 1354-5.
" Id. at 1356.
54 Id. at 1355-56.
5 Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1)).
56 Id.
5 Id. at 1356 (citation eliminated).
[ VOL. 20: 18
2011] Strength of the International Trade Commission as a Patent Venue
The Federal Circuit vacated the ITC's exclusion order because it exceeded the
ITC's statutory authority." None of the downstream device importers were named
respondents in the action. "Broadcom ... could have named such manufacturers as
respondents to the Section 337 investigation," but "Broadcom appear[ed] to have
made the strategic decision to not name downstream wireless device
manufacturers." 59  The ITC could have excluded these unnamed downstream
product importers via a GEO, but Broadcom did not request one or make the
60
necessary proof to meet the extra statutory requirements to warrant one.
B. Postulated Impacts of Kyocera
Kyocera reversed the ITC's long-standing practice of issuing LEOs that
extend to downstream products imported by unnamed respondents.61 LEOs are
now limited to named respondents in ITC actions. Accordingly, to exclude such
downstream importers via a Section 337 action, complainants presently have two
options: they may either explicitly name the importer as a respondent in the ITC
complaint 62 or they may request, and eventually meet, the requirements for a
GEO."
These impacts of Kyocera-both changing longstanding ITC remedy practice
and forcing complainants to add respondents or request GEOs to obtain remedies
that were once routine-have garnered much attention, particularly from patentees
and practitioners.6 4 Commentators have, in turn, postulated as to the impact of the
Kyocera decision on ITC practice. These postulates fall into three categories:
increasing the number of respondents in a given investigation, increasing requests
and grants of GEOs, or decreasing ITC filings. All three of the postulates and the
rationales behind them are explained below.
5 Id. at 1358.
'9Id. at 1357.
60 id.
61 Where is the ITC Going after Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 710-13.
62 Michael Lyons et al., Exclusion of Downstream Products After Kyocera: A Revised Framework
for General Exclusion Orders, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 821, 822-23
(2009) ("Obviously, a patent holder seeking to exclude only the downstream products of the
manufacturer of the infringing component itself would be unaffected by the [Kyocera] decision, as
would a patent holder that can name all possible downstream infringers as respondents in the
investigation.").
63 Id. at 833 ("[Platent holders should consider seeking a general exclusion order to exclude
downstream products. . . .").
64 See, e.g., id; see also Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 715-17.
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1. Increase in Number ofNamed ITC Respondents
One potential reaction to Kyocera is to simply name more respondents in the
ITC complaint. 5 Specifically, name those importers of downstream products that
the patentholder-the complainant-wishes to exclude. 66 Under Kyocera, and the
statutory language of § 1337(d) at issue, a named respondent can be subject to a
LEO; thus, if downstream importers are named, they can be excluded.67
This naming of more respondents is the very thing that the Federal Circuit
noted that Broadcom could have done.68 If Broadcom wanted to exclude handsets
via a LEO that included the Qualcomm infringing chip, but were imported by other
companies, it could have simply named those companies. Broadcom would then
have had a broader LEO available to it, even with the Kyocera ruling.
The assumption is that such a reaction-increasing the number of
respondents-is particularly likely in the electronics area because of the high rate
of integration of infringing products into a final, multi-component consumer
product prior to importation. This integration is typically done by someone other
than the base, electronic component manufacturer. Just as Qualcomm's chips were
put into handsets prior to import, other electronic components or software, which
may be covered by a patent, are packaged inside more complex goods before
entering the United States. To obtain an effective remedy-excluding all infringing
products-these downstream (multi-component product) importers need to be
excluded as well.
2. Increase in Requests for, and Grants of GEOs
The alternative to naming more respondents in order to expand the scope of
the available LEO is for a complainant to obtain a GEO. A GEO excludes all
infringing products, regardless of whether that product's importer was named in the
ITC action. As the Federal Circuit noted in Kyocera, § 1337(d)(2) explicitly
defines the GEO as an in rem remedy focused on the infringing device, not
particular respondents.
A GEO is another way to obtain an effective remedy against downstream
importers. 70 For example, as discussed above, Broadcom could have excluded
downstream headsets from being imported by unnamed respondents if it had
requested and received a GEO.
65 Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 716; Lyons et al., supra note 62, at
832-33.
66 id.
Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1357.
68 id.
69 Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1357-58.
70 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2006).
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For that reason, more GEOs may be requested and, hopefully, granted in
order for patentees to continue to obtain effective remedies. This reaction is driven
by the need to duplicate the now invalid broad LEOs that were issued before
Kyocera. The GEO is a way to get a similar remedy and still stay true to the
Kyocera interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
3. Decrease in ITC Filings
Other commentators postulate that Kyocera will actually lead to less ITC
filings.7 The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the two other responses to
Kyocera discussed above are actually not practical and will not be used by
patentees; without such corrections truly being available to patentees, the ITC may
no longer be a favorable venue and thus not used.72
Complainants may be reluctant to add more respondents, particularly
downstream product importers. Adding more respondents can increase the
duration and costs of an ITC investigation.74 More respondents means more
documents, more accused devices to investigate, and more depositions. All this
increases the likelihood of the patentee's failure at the ITC. Magnifying this
increase in costs to the patentee is the fact that respondents may also cooperate with
each other and share litigation costs. 75 This decreases the costs of litigating for
each individual respondent.7 6 Reduced costs allow respondents to decrease their
settlement point and stay with the investigation longer. The respondents may be
more likely to outlast the complainant when more respondents are present. In
addition, more respondents may increase the likelihood of failure by the patentee on
the merits. More alleged infringers in a given action means more pairs of eyes
looking for prior art, constructing invalidity defenses, and coming up with
noninfringement arguments, all of which makes the likelihood of a successful
argument higher.
Moreover, complainants are unlikely to add downstream importers as
respondents because these companies are usually the complainant's customers, or
potential customers. For example, the handset manufacturers in Kyocera were
both customers of the named respondent, Qualcomm, and the complainant,
Broadcom. A practitioner confirmed this line of reasoning, saying that "[i]n many
cases[,] the downstream manufacturer or distributor may be an actual or potential
7' See Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 720-21.
72 id.
73 Lyons et al., supra note 62, at 832-33 (noting that adding more respondents may not be practical).
74 Where is the ITC Going after Kyocera ?, supra note 12, at 716.
75 id
76 Id.
7 Id.
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customer of the complainant that the complainant would not ordinarily wish to
sue." 78
The alternative to adding more respondents is pursuing a GEO.79 This may
not be a viable option because of the high burden that accompanies GEOs.0 GEOs
are granted only upon a showing of widespread pattern of infringement and
evidence that others besides the respondent are attempting to enter the U.S. market
with infringing devices." Furthermore, the complainant must prove that the source
of these other infringers is difficult to identify. 82 The usual way to help prove these
facts is to name a large number of respondents in the complaint, which is likely to
be avoided for the reasons set forth above. Accordingly, this heightened burden has
resulted in very few granted GEOs. For example, over a ten-year period prior to
Kyocera when 158 complaints were filed, only eleven GEOs were issued. 83
Because of the fact that these alternatives to excluding downstream importers
post-Kyocera have their drawbacks, some commentators think the result will be
less use of the ITC. 84 The ITC becomes a less attractive venue for patent
infringement relief because of the incompleteness of the remedy it can provide.
Attempting to fill the void left by Kyocera is either strategically or commercially
harmful, in the case of naming more respondents, or practically impossible to
obtain, in the case of a GEO. As a result, less ITC complaints will be filed post-
Kyocera because one of the biggest advantages to the venue-broad injunctive
relief-is gone.
IV. Study Testing The Impact of Kyocera and Strength of the ITC
To test the hypotheses above, this study collects information on ITC filings,
decisions, and parallel United States district court filings to discern what, if any,
impact Kyocera has had. The discussion below describes the study's methodology
and the results from the data collected.
78 Brian Busey, Federal Circuit Limits ITC's Authority to Issue Downstream Exclusion Orders,
MORRIsoN FOERSTER, (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.mofo.com/federal-circuit-limits-itcs-authority-
to-issue-downstream-exclusion-orders-10-15-2008/.
7 Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 716-17; Lyons et al., supra note 62, at
833-34.
80 Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1358; Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 717-20.
81 Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 717.
82 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
83 Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, supra note 12, at 718.
84 In fact, one article suggests that data right after Kyocera supported this conclusion. Id. at 720-21
(finding a 43% decrease over a three month period after Kyocera).
8 Id. at 720.
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A. Study Methodology
The study focuses on two time periods-both before and after the Federal
Circuit's Kyocera decision, which was issued on October 14, 2008. The question is
how the decision has impacted litigant activity.
1. ITC Complaints and Determinations
The first set of data collected was from the ITC. Eighty-seven (87) complaints
filed after Kyocera, including all investigations initiated through the end of 2010,
were examined. An equal number of ITC complaints filed prior to Kyocera were
also looked at-those 87 complaints filed from March 22, 2006, until just prior to
the Federal Circuit's Kyocera decision. Only those ITC complaints filed that
alleged infringement of at least one utility patent were collected.
For each of these complaints, data was obtained from the ITC's online
Section 337 investigation database. This data included the date the action was
instituted, patents at issue, field of technology, complainants, and respondents. The
field of technology was determined by looking at the patents at issue and using
field of technologies categories that have been used in prior empirical patent
studies."
From this data, the number of respondents identified in each ITC complaint
was also calculated. The number of respondents was recorded in two ways. First,
the raw number of respondents was determined, with each named respondent
counting as a single respondent. Second, the respondents were "consolidated"
before counting in that corporately related respondents were counted as a single,
consolidated respondent. When determining whether to consolidate, care was
taken to err on the side of under-consolidating by combining respondents only if it
was clear from their name that they were related. 90 Thus, the consolidated number
86 Section 337 actions based solely on design patents and trademarks were not included in the study.
8 337 Investigational History, USITC, available at
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectualproperty/inv-his.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
88 Previous articles by this author, and others, have used fourteen industry categories to identify a
particular patent case with a given technology. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who 's
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration ofPatent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2110-
12 (2000) (listing and defining the 14 categories); Christopher Cotropia & Mark Lemley, Copying
in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1445 n.101 (2009) (explaining the use of the 14-category
system). Here, given the low numbers of patent cases being considered, the technology categories
have been combined and simplified, into three categories-(1) Electronics and Computer-Related
technologies; (2) Chemistry, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical technologies; and (3) Mechanical
technologies.
89 For example "Research In Motion, Ltd., Canada" and "Research In Motion Corporation, Irving
TX" were named as separate respondents in one investigation. Wireless Communications System
Server Software, Wireless Handheld Devices and Battery Packs, Inv. No. 337-TA-706 (Feb. 24,
2010) (Completed).
90 To give another example, "Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., South Korea," "Samsung Electronics
America, Inc. Ridgefield park, NJ," "Samsung International, Inc. San Diego, CA," "Samsung
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recorded is probably higher than the number of truly distinct (not legally or
factually related) respondents identified in a single ITC complaint.9 '
In addition, of the two groups of 87 complaints, a third subset was
constructed. This subset included all ITC complaints that were filed before the
Kyocera decision but which were still pending before the ITC when Kyocera was
issued. For this subset, the ITC dockets were looked at to determine whether any
respondents were added to the ITC action after the Kyocera decision.
The other numbers identified from these ITC complaints were the number of
ITC actions instituted per month over the periods prior to and after Kyocera. Data
on ITC actions during these windows before and after Kyocera was also collected
from issued ITC determinations. 92 The focus of the search was whether a GEO was
granted in a given ITC action and the number of such grants prior to and after
Kyocera.
2. District Court Complaints
Data on parallel district court complaints was also collected. It is common for
patent holders to file both a Section 337 complaint with the ITC on a given patent
and also to sue on the same patent for infringement in a United States district
court.93 This is often against the same alleged infringers, although the targets can
vary. Even if the patent holder does not file a district court complaint, the
respondents in the ITC action will typically file a declaratory judgment action in
district court.94
Thus, for a majority of the ITC complaints recorded, there were also parallel
district court complaints that could be collected. These were collected by searching
complaints in the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearing House ("IPLC")
database for cases filed alleging infringement of at least one of the same patents
identified in the ITC complaint. 95 The study also looked for other factors that
helped identify that it was truly a parallel case, such as filing of the district court
Semiconductor, Inc., San Jose, CA," and "Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC,
Richardson, TX," were named as separate respondents in one investigation and counted as a single
respondent upon consolidation. Flash Memory Chips and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No.
337-TA-735 (Sept. 13, 2010) (Pending).
91 Obviously, the study wanted to avoid counting an upstream and downstream producer as a single
entity. While these two producers are related-one using the others product in the product they are
making-they are counted separately even when consolidating respondents.
92 This information is also obtained from, again, the ITC's online, 337 action database. 337
Investigational History, USITC, available at
http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsflAllOpenView& Start-1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
93 See Chien, supra note 2, at 92-93 (documenting parallel litigations).
94 Id at 94 n.165.
9 See Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
http://lawstanford.edu/program/centers/iplc (last visited October 24, 2011).
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complaint around the same time period of the ITC complaint and the naming of at
least some of the same alleged infringers in the ITC complaint. Some of the
parallel cases recorded did not include all of the same patents as the ITC complaint,
but as long as one patent was the same, the district court complaint was considered
to be parallel. In addition, there were sometimes multiple district court complaints
for a given ITC complaint, and the data collected from these-number of alleged
infringers, for example-was combined and counted as part of a single, parallel
district court case.
For each parallel district court complaint, the following data was collected:
date complaint was filed and number of defendants. For declaratory judgment
actions, the plaintiffs were considered the "defendants" for this study's purposes.
The number of defendants was recorded in the same two manners as with ITC
complaints-the actual of number of defendants listed and the number of
defendants when they are consolidated.
B. Number of ITC Respondents
The number of named respondents in ITC complaints before and after the
Kyocera decision was first observed. For these numbers, the mean (average) and
median were calculated. The standard deviation was also calculated. The results
for the 87 complaints filed before Kyocera and 87 filed after are set forth in Tables
1 and 2 below. Table 1 is from the raw respondent numbers, while Table 2 uses the
"consolidated" respondent numbers- results that merge related corporate entities
into one counted respondent.
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
(n=87) (n=87)
Mean 6.62 6.95
Standard 9.06 7.53
Deviation
Median 3 3
Table 1 - Number of Respondents Named
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
(n=87) (n=87)
Mean 5.31 4.87
Standard 8.39 6.13
Deviation
Median 2 2
Table 2 - Number of Respondents Named
(Consolidated)
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From this data, a two-sided t-test was performed to determine whether the
differences in means both prior to and after Kyocera were statistically significant.9 6
The differences both between the raw respondent averages and consolidated
respondents averages were not statistically significant.97 In addition, the median
has stayed the same under both respondent calculations.
These results may hide the real story, however, because Kyocera likely does
not impact all industries the same. Only those industries with multi-component
products-products were infringing devices are sold and integrated into
downstream devices before importation-are the ones that may need to increase the
number of respondents to still get an effective remedy post-Kyocera. Accordingly,
the consolidated respondent numbers are set forth below by technology in Tables 3,
4, and 5.9'
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
(n=56) (n=74)
Mean 5.66 4.72
Standard 8.35 5.87
Deviation
Median 2 2
Table 3 - Number of Respondents Named (Consolidated) -
Electronics/Computer-Related
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
(n= 19) (n=2)
Mean 5.47 15.5
Standard 10.69 13.44
Deviation
Median 2 15.5
Table 4 - Number of Respondents Named (Consolidated) -
Chemistry/Biotechnology/Pharmaceutical
96 See James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, INTRODUCTION To ECONOMETRICS 68-70 (2003) (de-
scribing the t-test).
9 The t-test produced a p-value of 0.7922 for the raw number of respondents and 0.6957 for the con-
solidated numbers. For the distribution to be statistically significant, a p-value must be less than
0.05. See David Freedman et al., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed. 1998). A p-value less than 0.01 is consid-
ered highly statistically significant. Id.
98 Similar results are observed when using the raw respondent numbers.
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Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
(n=12) (n=11)
Mean 3.17 4
Standard 3.16 5.51
Deviation
Median 2 2
Table 5 - Number of Respondents Named (Consolidated) -
Mechanical
The average number of respondents in the electronics and computer-related
technological areas went down after Kyocera (5.66 to 4.72). A t-test showed that
this difference is not statistically significant.99 In contrast, in the other two
technological areas-chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical technologies
and mechanical technologies, the average went up after Kyocera. However, these
later numbers come from a very small sample size-something not surprising given
that the ITC's usage is dominated by the electronics industry.
For the third subset of ITC actions looked at-those filed before Kyocera but
were pending when the Kyocera decision was issued-the number of respondents
added after Kyocera was examined. For the 39 investigations that fit into this
category, none of them added respondents after Kyocera's issuance. Respondents
were added in these cases.100 However, none of these additions took place after
Kyocera issued.
These results can be compared to the number of defendants named in parallel
district court lawsuits. In the 87 cases prior to Kyocera, there was parallel district
court lawsuits filed in 77 of them. For the 87 after Kyocera, there were parallel
district court lawsuits in 77 of them. The number of defendants named, both the
raw numbers and those consolidated for obviously corporately related defendants,
are reproduced in Tables 6 and 7 below. In each table, the ITC data, discussed
above, is reproduced next to the district court data for comparison purposes.
9 The t-test produced a p-value of 0.4641. When looking at the raw number of respondents, the t-
test produced a p-value of 0.4652.
100 See, e.g., In re Certain Computer Products, Computer Components and Products Containing the
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-628 (Jan. 31, 2008) (adding two additional respondents after the com-
plaint was filed).
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Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
ITC D.Ct. ITC D.Ct.
Mean 6.62 5.62 6.95 5.70
St. Dev. 9.06 7.90 7.53 7.20
Median 3 3 3 3
Table 6 - Number of Respondents/Defendants Named
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
ITC D.Ct. ITC D.Ct.
Mean 5.31 3.98 4.87 4.22
St. Dev. 8.39 6.16 6.13 6.71
Median 2 2 2 1
Table 7 - Number of Respondents/Defendants Named (Consolidated)
The mean number of defendants in parallel district court cases essentially did
not change when looking at the raw number of defendants (5.62 to 5.70), while ITC
respondents increased slightly (6.62 to 6.95). When looking at consolidated
defendants, the defendants in parallel district court cases increased slightly (3.98 to
4.22), while ITC consolidated respondents decreased (5.31 to 4.87). T-tests for
both the raw and consolidated numbers indicated that the difference in means in the
district court, like in the ITC, were not statistically significant.'o'
Of particular interest are those parallel district court cases involving
electronics and computer-related technologies. These are shown, next to the ITC
data, in Table 8 below, looking at consolidated defendants/respondents.
Pre-Kyocera Post-Kyocera
ITC D.Ct. ITC D.Ct.
Mean 5.66 4.25 4.72 3.75
St. Dev. 8.35 6.87 5.87 6.10
Median 2 1 2 1
Table 8 -- Number of Respondents/Defendants Named (Consolidated) -
Electronics/Computer-Related
'01 The t-test produced p-values of 0.9304 for the raw number of respondents and 0.9281 for the con-
solidated number.
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As with the ITC numbers, the difference in the average number of
respondents in district court electronics and computer-related cases was not
statistically significant.102 This holds true when looking at the raw number of
defendants as well.10 3
C. GEOs Granted
The number of GEOs granted before and after Kyocera was collected. Two
GEOs were granted in the 87 investigations started before Kyocera; none have yet
been issued after.'0 One GEO grant came before Kyocera was issued and one
after. However, not enough time has passed for those investigations after Kyocera
to reach a final determination, that is, to have survived past presidential review, at
the time of this study.
Another factor one can look at to determine whether complainants are
pushing harder for GEOs is whether they are naming a large number of
respondents. The more respondents named, the easier it is for a complainant to
meet the numerosity and inability to identify requirements for a GEO.'05
Looking at the 174 investigations in the data set, sixteen (16) of the
investigations prior to Kyocera named more than ten respondents, while twenty-two
(22) investigations after Kyocera named more than ten. This difference is not
statistically significant. 106 When the respondents are consolidated, there is no
difference before and after Kyocera. Thirteen investigations both before and after
Kyocera name ten or more consolidated respondents.
D. ITC Filings
The number of ITC filing was also looked at. First, the ITC complaint data
was examined in two windows- a two-year period prior to Kyocera, and a two-
year period after. In Table 9, below, the total number of Section 337 investigations,
involving utility patents, in both of these windows is reported. The data in Table 9
is also broken up by technology.
102 The t-test produced a p-value of 0.6779.
103 The t-test produced a p-value of 0.5855.
104 See Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Products Containing Same, Inv. No.
337-TA-650; Ink Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-565 (granting GEO
before and after Kyocera).
1 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2).
106 Using the Pearson's chi-squared test, a two-tail p-value of 0.18 was observed.
192011]
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA wJOURNAL
2 Years Prior 2 Years After
to Kyocera Kyocera
Total 68 74
Electronics/Computer- 45 62
Related
Chemistry/Biotechnology/ 12 2
Pharmaceutical
Mechanical 11 10
Table 9 - Number of Section 337 Investigations
The number of investigations in a two-year period is higher after Kyocera,
with 74 investigations being filed. This is six more than those filed two years
before Kyocera. When looking at only electronics and computer-related
technologies, the increase in investigation after Kyocera is greater, with 62
investigations after Kyocera compared to 45 before. The opposite effect is seen in
the other technology fields, with the greatest drop in the biological, chemical, and
pharmaceutical field.
Next, the rate of investigations initiated over time was observed. Specifically,
Graph 1, below, shows the number of Section 337 investigations filed per month
from April 2006 to December 2010.107
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Graph 1 - Number of 337 Investigations Filed Per Month
107 This is for only those Section 337 actions including utility patents.
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A linear regression plot line is overlaid in Graph 1 on the data observed. It
shows an increase in ITC Section 337 investigations, with Kyocera issuing at
essentially the center of the graph in October of 2008. From April of 2006 until
December of 2010, it appears the average number of ITC complaints initiated a
month has gone up from a little over two a month to almost four a month.
V. Implications for Kyocera and the ITC as a Patent Venue
A. Data Does Not Support the Post-Kyocera Predictions
The data collected does not support any of the predictions of Kyocera's
impact.
1. Named Respondents Did Not Increase
The number of respondents named after Kyocera did not increase as predicted
from the number named prior to Kyocera. The average raw number of respondents
raised slightly (6.62 to 6.95).'0 When looking at the consolidated numbers, the
respondents named actually went down by a greater magnitude (5.31 to 4.87).09
Neither of these changes is statistically significant.o10 These results run counter to
predictions that the number of respondents would increase to capture downstream
product importers. The number of named respondents has remained essentially
constant.
In addition, when looking at the subset of investigations filed before Kyocera
but still pending when Kyocera was issued, the data also does not support the
hypothesis that respondents named will increase. For all 39 investigations that fit
within this category, the complainant did not add respondents after Kyocera.
The results run counter to the hypothesis even more when focusing on the
industry that Kyocera is most likely to have a negative impact-the electronics and
computer-related industries. The number of named respondents decreased both
when reported as raw results (7.22 to 7.03) and consolidated (5.66 to 4.72). "
These differences were also not statistically significant.112 Such results further
rebut the assumption that patentees in this industry would increase the number of
named respondents when filing ITC complaints.
The results are not conclusive, however. When looked at in isolation, there is
no control to ensure that changes in the number of respondents are due solely, if at
all, to the Kyocera decision. Other legal and economic changes can also influence
the number of respondents named. The results reported above do not control for
1os See supra Table 1.
109 See supra Table 2.
110 See supra note 97.
'" See supra Table 3.
112 See supra note 100.
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such influences. And thus, it might be that Kyocera actually did increase the
number of respondents, but there were countervailing influences that pushed the
number down, masking the impact of Kyocera.
But the results in parallel district court cases suggest there were no such
influences. These cases include some of the exact same facts as the ITC cases-
similar patents, similar alleged infringers, and filed around the same time. And in
these cases the number of defendants did not change much at all from before to
after the Kyocera decision, with the raw number of defendants (5.62 to 5.70) and
consolidated number of defendants (3.98 to 4.22) essentially staying constant.'13
These differences were found to not be statistically significant.l 14 When Kyocera is
taken away, but the other facts stay essentially the same, there is no change in
number of accused infringers. This suggests no such external factors where
present, or at the very least, impacted how many defendants a patentee would name
in a given litigation."'5 Admittedly, the ITC and district court cases are not exactly
the same, given the jurisdictional and likely defendant differences.' However, the
parallel district court data discount an alternative explanation for the ITC results.
That is, the district court data supports the conclusion that Kyocera did not increase
the number of respondents.
The ITC data could also be discounted because, even when isolated to just
electronic and computer-related technologies, the cases considered are too broad.
The focus needs to be on changes in respondent numbers in cases that involved
downstream importers - the specific types of cases Kyocera impacts.117
This is a valid critique. But doing such a narrow study with any accuracy
would be very difficult. When looking at those ITC cases that name more than ten
respondents prior to and after Kyocera, no statistical differences in the number of
such cases is observed." 8 Cases with downstream importers, particularly after
Kyocera, would likely be those that name a large number of respondents (e.g., more
than ten). It turns out that there is no real uptick, or any change, in the number of
such cases filed at the ITC after Kyocera.
2. GEO Grants Did Not Increase
The rate of GEO grants did not change much either. Just as infrequent as they
were before Kyocera, they are after. Only two were granted over the almost five
113 See supra Tables 7 & 8.
114 See supra note 102.
1s Or at the very least, any that were present offset each other in their impact on number of respond-
ents.
116 See supra Part II.A. (detailing differences/advantages of the ITC).
117 See Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1345, 1357-58 (discussing the statutory authority of the ITC to grant
GEOs and LEOs against downstream products of non-respondents).
"' See supra Part III.C.
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year period observed.' 19 These were granted on two investigations started prior to
Kyocera, with one GEO actually granted after Kyocera.120 And, when using the
naming of a large number of respondents as a proxy for a complainant trying to
obtain a GEO, no statistically significant change before and after Kyocera is
observed.121 There does not appear to be much of a change in reliance on or
granting of GEOs after Kyocera.
3. ITC Filings Did Increase
Given the two results observed above-the number of respondents and GEO
has not increased-the natural conclusion would be that patentees have simply
deserted the ITC. Without these two safety valves to get around the restrictions of
Kyocera being used, the ITC is no longer a viable venue.122 Instead of using the
workarounds, patentees must be forgoing the ITC altogether.123
The data shows that this is not the case. The rate of ITC filings continues to
increase, with Kyocera not dampening the trend at all.124 The increase over the
four-year period observed is quite large, with the number of investigations started
per month almost doubling. A linear regression establishes this fact.
And in the industry that is the most likely to be affected by Kyocera, the
electronics and computer-related industries, the increase is the most significant
amongst the various technologies observed. The number of investigations
increased from 45 before to 62 after Kyocera.'25
B. Data Implications Regarding the ITC as a Patent Venue
The data provides insights regarding the ITC beyond discounting the
hypotheses of Kyocera's impact. Most significantly, the data shows how attractive,
and in turn used, the ITC is for patent enforcement.
Initially, the fact that ITC filings have continued to increase, even though the
scope of remedies available at the ITC, due to Kyocera, has decreased, reinforces
that patentees favor the ITC as a venue. Even with restricted remedies, patentees
still file ITC actions and the amount of filings is still increasing. This suggests that
the other advantages-jurisdictional-breadth, speed of adjudication, high-likelihood
of injunctive relief-have tremendous perceived individual value to the patentee.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id
122 See supra Part I.B.
123 id.
124 See supra Graph 1.
125 See supra Table 9.
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Kyocera has not dampened these advantages and patentees, by continuing to
increase their usage of the ITC, confirm this fact.
Second, the data confirms some common assumptions about the ITC. The
data shows that the ITC is mainly a venue for electronic and computer-related
patent disputes. Of the 174 investigations looked at, 130 investigations (75%)
involved the electronic and computer-related industries. And the trend is toward an
even greater prevalence of these industries at the ITC, with 74 of the last 87
investigations (85%) at the ITC involving patents covering electronics and
computer-related technologies.
Third, the filing of a parallel district court cases is extremely common. Of the
174 investigations observed, parallel district court cases were filed in 154 of those
cases (89%). This means that around the same time of an ITC case, at least one of
the patents in that ITC case was also the subject of a district court patent
infringement case. This data falls in line with that observed by Chien in an earlier
study, finding that "there was close to a 90 percent likelihood that, for any given
ITC dispute, at least one of the patents litigation was also at some point the subject
of a district court dispute."126 ITC actions, therefore, cannot be considered in
isolation. They are almost always part of a larger, multi-venue push to enforce
patent rights in the United States.
VI. Conclusion
The results are surprising. While consensus is that Kyocera should either
increase the number of respondents, reliance upon and granting of GEOs, or both,
neither has happened; this is true even in the electronics and computer-related
industries that were predicted to be hit the hardest. Even with no such correction
by patentees to obtain exclusion orders having pre-Kyocera scope, the usage of the
ITC continues to rise.
These findings do more than simply answer open questions regarding
Kyocera. Their significance is much broader. The results speak volumes to the
favorability of the ITC as a venue for patent enforcement. In the face of a dramatic
change in the law that significantly reduced the remedies available at the ITC, ITC
filings continued to increase. The ITC is clearly a major part of patent enforcement
landscape in the United States.
126 See Chien, supra note 2, at 92.
24 [ VOL. 20: 1
